MEDIATION, BILATERALISM AND ARMS CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA

South Asia is one of the most volatile regions with respect to nuclear weapons. The relations between India and Pakistan are replete with frictions, crises, animosities and mistrust that keep them polls apart. These relations are also colored with heavy military expenditures on incessant conventional and nuclear arms races despite languishing in dreadfully high scales of poverty. They have fought four wars and experienced various crises, to include Brasstacks, Kashmir crisis of 1990, military stand off in 2001 and 2008 etcetera. Periods of peace have at been short and rare; Ashley Tellis has termed it as “Ugly Instability”. Dynamics of Indo-Pak relations are not that simple and straight. It is a complicated web of historical rivalries, ideological mindsets, political and strategic thinking, public pressures, territorial disputes, irrational decisions of Radcliff Award, water disputes and so many other factors that make it more challenging to reach to harmonious agreements. Bill Clinton also described South Asia as the “world’s most dangerous place”.  The distinction of Pak-India crisis from rest of the world’s crises is that the speed of escalation is extremely rapid that speaks of the non-existence of Crisis Stability Mechanisms between them. In the absence of Crisis Stability the chances of escalation of a conventional war into a nuclear war increase manifold.

Arms control on the other hand, is the way forward that lies between the extremes of ‘Stubborn Strategic opposition between Nuclear Powers’ and ‘Liberalism’. In other words, Arms Control implies any international control or limitation of the development, testing, production, deployment, or use of weapons The ground needed for arms controls is the creation of trust and confidence in each other with the sole purpose of restraint in the vertical arms race between two arch rivals possessing nuclear weapons. Ironically, this aspect is lacking in the case of South Asia. The nuclear matrix, in this case, dwindles in the presence of various paradoxes, i.e. Stability-Instability Paradox, Vulnerability-Invulnerability Paradox and Always-Never Paradox.

            Political Stability in realm of nuclear field necessitates the absence of an urge on the part of nuclear actors to change the political status quo. However, if we put this criterion to the Indo-Pak relations, it is a far cry. And it is evident from the political leaders’ voices on both sides of the borders. Every now and then, Kashmir (both IHK and AK) is claimed by India and Pakistan concurrently. In such an environment in which both of these states are armed with nuclear weapons, the constant ‘tug of war’ is a permanent feature. So, the political stability amongst these countries remains under permanent threat.

            We are aware of the determination with which conventional as well as nuclear arms have been either acquired or produced by these states. There is an action-reaction syndrome that keeps agitating them to have more and better arsenals than the other. It is not only confined to military and security circles, but is deeply inter-twined in the social structures and priorities. We would prefer winning a cricket league match against India at the cost of losing a world cup final to a country other than India and vice versa. Such is the intricacy and delicacy of this relationship.

            Now, let us discuss the prospects of arms control in Indo-Pak relations with a view to evaluate the likelihood of mediation and bilateralism. Arms control takes place on three over-riding assumptions: One, that the adversaries realize with the passage of time that they have gone too far where the hi-tech arsenals have made them more secure and more insecure at the same time, and if they fall down from this height, they will end up at ultimate disaster; Two, that the rivals have already spent so much and cannot sustain this expenditure anymore because there is no end to it and probably the deprived commoners deserve lot more to be spent over them; Three, that the states have reached a level of saturation and a better sense prevail. If we closely look at these assumptions, the second assumption seems to be prevailing relatively more than the first and third assumption.

There are certain fundamental requirements to initiate the process of arms control and restraint measures. These requirements are cost-benefit analysis, good faith and increasing transparency. First, the cost-benefit analysis is translated in the exhibition of flexibility in drawing the security relations matrix of the rivals as the cost, while the well being of the people of respective states as the benefit. Both the states have to strike a balance in order to initiate arms control. Secondly, the existence of Good Faith. Although this aspect is quite missing in international relations and is strongly disregarded by realist school of thought. Notwithstanding, it has all the potential to dissuade an inproportionate arms race. Thirdly, increasing transparency. Due to vulnerability-invulnerability syndrome, the nuclear assets are kept with absolute discreetness. In order to kick off arms control, the transparency of nuclear programs has to be increased by incorporating credible verification mechanisms. And this requires concrete political will in the face of diversified challenges.

Now, let us consider the possibility of a mediator in substantiating the process of arms control in Indo-Pak. Generally, the world powers do exercise their influence over less powerful countries. Accordingly, in case of India and Pakistan the possible mediators could be United States, Russia, China and United Kingdom. Let us consider them one by one. Unites States: The Indo-US nuclear deal is a testimony that U.S. is not interested in any kind of arms control in South Asia. Because this deal has been a trigger to induce both Pakistan and India into an arms race and creating a phenomenal disparity in terms of fissile material. That has added to the arms race instability. At the same time, U.S. would not like to lose a nuclear market that she has created after waiving off certain restrictions for India and crossing the barriers of technology control regimes. In addition, India has been importing large quantities of military weapons and equipment from U.S. and both of them would not like to stall these imports. Then, the record of U.S. adhering to Article-VI of Non Proliferation Treaty is largely insignificant, thus reducing it’s credibility as a mediator. In a nutshell, the prospects of U.S. mediating an arms control between India and Pakistan are lesser. Russia: Historically, India has been aligned with Russia and has been provided with all kinds of military assistance and cultivates close defence cooperation that speak volumes about India’s military dependence on Russia. Recent submarines and aircraft carrier are a case in point. While India rely so heavily on Russian military assistance, it is unlikely that Russia would like to lose a customer in the wake of Russian unhealthy economy. India has been importing fuel for their nuclear reactors for years and Russia would like to lay hands on the growing Indian infrastructure as a result of Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. The record of Russia like that of U.S. adhering to Article-VI of Non Proliferation Treaty is as bad as that of U.S. thus reducing it’s credibility too. Russia has to sacrifice certain economic interests if she decides to act as a mediator. However, U.S. may look at it from the prism of losing influence in the region. United Kingdom: Comparatively lesser military inter-dependence with India than U.S. and Russia. Unlike U.S. and Russia, the U.K. has not indulged in larger arms races by observing considerable restraint in nuclear arms that has increased its credibility as technology control regime complier, consequently enhancing its acceptability both in India and Pakistan. U.K. understands the dynamics of Indo-Pak relations in a much better way for she has ruled over the region for more than two hundred years in pre-partition times. She knows about the sensitivities of India and Pakistan relatively much better than other probable mediators. The prospects of U.K. acting as mediator carry considerable weight. China: Despite China’s economic and military prowess, she will be taken by India as a party and not as a credible mediator because of its close strategic ties with Pakistan. India has also fought a war with China in 1962. Lastly, U.S. and Russia would not like to give away their economic interests as well as grant China the leverage of accruing more influence in the region. Thus the prospects for China as mediator also carry less promise.

Besides the above mentioned possibilities of mediation, there is yet anther method to untangle the knot, i.e. bilateralism. Historically, India had been avoiding mediation and arbitration. She had been quite intransigent on this subject particularly in the face of all United Nation’s resolutions on Kashmir. And it was therefore decided in ‘Simla Agreement’ to resolve all outstanding issues bilaterally. It is therefore, pertinent to initiate arms control measures on either side for the betterment of the people on both sides that has healthy chances of making its way rather than involving a third party who would be aspiring to safeguard their own national interests first rather than Indo-Pak. Bilateralism is a trade off between two conflicting interests while the inclusion of mediator would make it more complicated by incorporating the mediator’s interests too. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that bilateralism carries great chances of a much awaited breakthrough in the realm of arms control in South Asia. Hopelessness is worse than failure. So, let us not be hopeless and play our part for the good of the region and the world as a whole.