How to Make Proxy War Succeed
in Baluchistan
By Dr Amarjit Singh
In Indian Defence Review - 20
Apr, 2013
http://www.rifah.org/site/how-to-make-proxy-war-succeed-in-baluchistan/
This article published in India’s
official “Defence Review” confirms that the creation of Bangladesh was the result of an
Indian military operation and that the “Mukti Bahini” largely comprised of
Bengali soldiers of Indian forces. India hopes to replicate that ‘success’ with
a war all along the Indo-Pakistan frontier with the BLA beefed up with
“volunteers” and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent neutralised with the help of the
USA. That should wake up the political strategists who think that trade and
films would rid India of its
imperial ambition to block/flood rivers and to balkanise Pakistan. The conclusion is
very apt; there is no need to pretend and play “quest for peace” or find excuse
for covert operations; the two countries have been at war for 65 years+ Usman
Khalid+
For decades, Pakistan has engaged in a proxy war against India.
Much of that proxy war has been secretive, while many of those secrets have
been exposed. At other times, Pakistan
has made threats of taking war deep inside Indian Territory, and Hamid Gul has
openly voiced the disintegration of India. Pakistan’s proxy wars have extended from J&K
and Punjab to the Northeast regions and the
Maoist belt. Pakistani assistance for the Indian mujahedeen and home
grown Indian terrorists has arrived by way of Nepal,
Burma, Bangladesh, infiltration across the LOC in
J&K, and infiltration of the Punjab and
Rajasthan borders. The smuggling of narcotics into Punjab is accompanied by
small arms quickly stockpiled in sleeper cells and mosques across India.
Pakistan is playing towards
an endgame; in contrast, India
reacts in knee-jerk fashion, rather than catching Pakistani action before the
effect, and finds its own plays in Pakistan stymied by an ever-alert ISI.
Pakistan is playing towards an
endgame; in contrast, India
reacts in knee-jerk fashion, rather than catching Pakistani action before the
effect…
For years, Pakistan has succeeded in suborning Indian
military and government officers and politicians, while India has fallen flat in all such
attempts. And even today, Pakistan
finds sympathizers among a very large Indian population that would rather see
Muslim and Pakistani rule in India
rather than secular Indian rule. Given this internal shortcoming, India
has enemies not only on its borders, but within, as well. This makes India’s
task of maintaining its sovereignty all the more difficult. But
fortunately for India, India’s massive population serves as a buffer to
a lot of that action, thereby serving to mitigate and absorb the forces that
would otherwise disintegrate India.
But for India
to bank on this strength alone would be unwise, for this bastion can easily
break, just as it was broken for the past one thousand years before
independence in 1947.
Pakistani has truly bled India
by its proxy wars. Revenue income from J&K and the North East are
much lower than potential. Narcotic distribution by Pakistan in Punjab has resulted in lacklustre
growth in Punjab’s GDP – for decades the most prosperous state in India.
The Maoists have sucked revenue growth in nearly 40% of India’s land mass. That India
should grow in real terms at 6% per year is simply amazing given these
odds. What India
could do if these hurdles and negative forces were absent would probably be
nothing short of a miracle. It therefore seems appropriate to conclude
that Pakistan is coming in
the direct way of India’s
miracle. Naturally, no rational Indian wants to see Pakistan continue to do so.
Hence, the common Indian further concludes that Pakistan
must either be stopped in its destructive actions against India by peaceful action, or be
annihilated by force to cease and desist.
The former sees no chance
of success: all the diplomacy over decades by the 800-strong Indian Foreign
service has yielded nothing more than failures, four wars, and numerous smaller
military actions, and daily incursions by Pakistan
into India.
This is not what can be called successful Indian diplomacy, no matter how smart
the diplomats or what scores they earned in their IAS entrance exams. The
real world of diplomacy consists of grenades and bullets, not roses and choice
gardens. The real world offers injured and dead soldiers and widows, not posh
bungalows in Lutyens’ Delhi.
The real world sees blood, sweat, heat, cold, and tears in guarding the
borders, not air conditioned rooms of rich parliamentarians in central and
south Delhi.
It is time to come with the wave, to understand mainstream India, to think like
the Indians who earn less than $2 a day – mainstream India – which doesn’t get
three square meals a day, and is pained to access medical assistance, and dies
prematurely largely because there is an enemy that sucks India’s resources and
kills its people from within. For Pakistan,
it is a very intelligent way to succeed against a larger India; for India, it is the lamb being led to
the slaughterhouse. And because mainstream India continues to carry an
ever-increasing yoke, they are slowly turning against the governments that are
supposed to look after them. Long gone is the time when the poor looked
upon the government as mai-baap. The increased alienation of
mainstream India from Indian
government is a direct threat to India’s security and
sovereignty. Aadhar and other such programs are scarcely going to lift
the sense of alienation, no matter which government or coalition is at the
centre.
…a proxy war by Pakistan
in two Indian provinces merely affects less than 10% of all Indian provinces; a
proxy war by India in two
Pakistani provinces can affect 40% of Pakistan.
Thus, in this thesis, the actions that
detract from Indian economic growth must be neutralized, and foremost among
these is Pakistani proxy wars and interference in India. So, short of an
invasion of Pakistan, an
Indian proxy war inside Pakistan
must be expanded. Whereas a proxy war by Pakistan
in two Indian provinces merely affects less than 10% of all Indian provinces, a
proxy war by India in two
Pakistani provinces can affect 40% of Pakistan. By its sheer size,
Pakistani resilience can be less, and Pakistani response to Indian proxy wars
can be less effective. In addition, the effect of proxy wars on the
Pakistani economy can be much more to Pakistan
than a proxy war on India by
Pakistan.
Nevertheless, Pakistan
did not learn the lesson that those who live in glass houses should not throw
stones. Pakistan never
thought that two could play the game; or else, they thought they could
disintegrate India before India
woke up. Well, that was not the case. India
plans to take proxy wars into Pakistani territory, and pay Pakistan back in its own
coin. But let’s analyze how a proxy war may succeed within Pakistan.
Requisite Principles of Proxy Wars
As experience around the world has shown,
a successful proxy war that is able to disaffiliate a part of a territory or
initiate regime change in a country must consider four major parameters:
The numerical size of
the rebel army
The volume of external
aid and military assistance actually provided to the rebels
The resolve and ability
of the home army to resist the armed rebellion
The physical presence of
external military action by a foreign country.
We can study a few examples to illustrate
that all the above four must be present in appropriate proportions for the
rebellion to succeed. Requisites 1, 2, and 4 should be as high as
possible, while requisite 3 should be as low as possible.
In 1971, the Mukti Bahini
had rebels in large numbers, and received a large volume of Indian military
supplies, advisors, and Bengali soldiers from the Indian army, thus fulfilling
requisites 1 and 2 above. However, Pakistan had about one corps plus two
divisions spread over all parts of Bangladesh to suppress all uprisings in all
parts of East Pakistan, thereby demonstrating Pakistani resolve to hold on to
East Pakistan, thereby fulfilling requisite 3 above. But then, as anyone
can understand, without Indian
military action that invaded East Pakistan, no one thinks that Bangladesh
would have been created. Hence, Mukti Bahini resistance would have been
resisted by Pakistani forces till doomsday, even if it meant that the economy would go to ruin and all East
Pakistanis would die. Therefore, the liberation of Bangladesh
would have been impossible without direct Indian military intervention.
…the effect of proxy wars on the Pakistani
economy can be much more to Pakistan
than a proxy war on India by
Pakistan.
Look now at how the
Americans fought off the Russians in Afghanistan. The Americans
benefitted from a very large numerical rebel force in the shape of the
mujahedeen, supplied effective firepower to them, such as the stinger missiles
that succeeded in bringing down the vast majority of the Russian helicopter and
air fighting fleet, and supplied military and CIA advisors on the ground.
These fulfilled requisites 1 and 2 above. Russian resolve began to weaken
after American weaponry began to take a toll on their military, thereby
assuring that requisite 3 did not continue as a major criterion in the rebel
action. Finally, Pakistani forces were lined up along the entire Durand
line to offer physical support to the mujahidin, impart physical training and
logistics in executing rebel action, and stood as a solid front to dissuade a
Russian invasion of Pakistan,
while standing as a threat of possibly intervening in Afghanistan should the situation
call for it with American blessings. This requisite 4 was present in this
long drawn battle that eventually saw success by the rebels.
Later, in Kosovo, NATO
bombing was so devastating and overwhelming that internal resolve to resist was
wiped out. But, even with a small numerical size of the rebel army, the
out-of-proportion external military intervention via aerial bombing carried the
day, and Kosovo was set on the path of independence.
Look next at Libya: a large rebel base, especially in East Libya, was granted weapons by NATO while CIA
advisors guided strategy and tactics on the ground. American army teams
provided clandestine field medical facilities. The Libyan army had
already been reduced to ineffectiveness by Gaddafi because he feared they may
launch a coup against him just as he did against King Idris, so the ability of
the Libyan army to resist was reduced. Gaddafi had to procure mercenaries
from neighbouring Male who had mixed loyalties and so took Gaddafi’s money till
the going was good, but then abandoned him when the going got tough.
Finally, NATO warplanes such as the Eurofighter and Rafale delivered the coup
d’etat to Libyan forces for over weeks of prolonged fighting. Again, we
see that all four requisites in our criteria were present to favourable degrees
for the regime change to succeed through a proxy war.
Now look at Syria: Whereas the Free Syrian Army has a large
numerical size, the arms it receives are limited as America
refuses to arm them, while Europe is a
reluctant supplier. The resolve of Bashar Assad to resist knows no end;
and external intervention is all but missing, with only one or two Israeli air
raids into Syria, but that
also only to target fissile nuclear material and movement of trucks and
machinery required for Syria’s
clandestine nuclear program. Hence, it can be observed that Syria’s
civil war is dragging on slowly and painfully at a rotten pace. The
external ingredient is convincingly missing in the right proportion for the
rebel action to succeed convincingly. Thus, the lesser the external
supply and physical action on the ground, the longer the rebel action can be
expected to take; if external assistance is stepped up, the Assad regime is
likely to crumble faster.
India has sent in up to
500,000 troops at one time to control Kashmir.
Moreover, any military action that Pakistan initiates across the Line
of Control (LOC) is not sufficient to overpower Indian forces.
The applications of the
requisites are applicable and relevant everywhere. The Chechen and
Sinkiang rebellions have been unsuccessful because there is no external
physical action present. The only armaments they get are from other
Islamic groups in Asia, which is of an
insufficient and meagre amount. Sinkiang rebels have been trained second
hand by mujahidin in Afghanistan
and madrasas in Pakistan,
a poor substitute for the real training. Similarly, the Mindanao rebels have
failed to severe from the Philippines
because internal resolve to resist them is high and external actions to
intervene are absent. Gaddafi funded the Mindanao
rebels for a long time in the 1990s and 2000s, and their rebel attacks were
aggressive during those days, but the situation is apparently contained now
because the necessary requisites have further diminished.
In 1979, we saw that the
Cambodian populace, unable to overthrow a blood-sucking Pol-Pot, required an
actual Vietnamese invasion to overthrow the brutal regime, since no amount of
earlier Vietnamese weapon assistance to the rebel armies seemed to
suffice. Overall, it can be noticed all over the world that the principle
of the four requisites is applicable and relevant in every proxy war that
anyone seeks to fight.
The Principle of Requisites Applied to
Pakistan’s Proxy Wars in India
Coming now to India, it is
seen that Nagaland is still a part of India in spite of the fact that the
numerical size of rebels was tangible; they received small arms from outside
sources (read: China and Pakistan). But they underestimated the resolve
of successive Indian governments, and there was no external enemy action
against Nagaland. Hence requisite 1 existed; requisite 2 was present to a
considerable extent, but not to the fullest extent; and requisites 3 and 4 were
absent; the result: proxy wars waged by Pakistan
and China
in Nagaland have been unsuccessful in severing Nagaland from the Indian union.
…the uprisings, revolts, and rebellions
continue in Baluchistan today. MI6 and
CIA are interested in carving the country of Baluchistan, in which they find
themselves as strange bedfellows with Iran, with the same end interest,
but for a different reason.
Extend this principle to
J&K. Pakistan has
tried repeatedly since 1947 to severe J&K from India. Pakistan has provided small arms, sent its own
military personnel to infiltrate Kashmir to create turmoil, has grown a rebel
mujahidin army with the help of other terrorist outfits, and has succeeded in
destroying the economic base of Kashmir, but has failed to severe Kashmir from India.
India’s
resolve to hang on to J&K is steadfast, resolute, and non-negotiable.
In addition, India has sent
in up to 500,000 troops at one time to control Kashmir.
Moreover, any military action that Pakistan initiates across the Line
of Control (LOC) is not sufficient to overpower Indian forces. Hence,
whereas requisites 1 and 2 are present in Kashmir,
requisites 3 and 4 are not present in adequate proportions.
The situation with the
Maoists has not reached extreme proportions yet. Perhaps when India has
to fight on two-and-a-half fronts, this dimension may pose a problem, but for
the present, the Maoist situation, by itself, is missing requisites 3 and 4;
requisite 1 is very, very strongly in its favour, and requisite 2 is also
existent because the Maoists are known to receive small arms with Chinese
markings, unless the allegation is propaganda by Indian counter-intelligence.
Hence, the Maoists can fret and fume from event after event, but they will be
unable to secure major advantages till requisites 3 and 4 fall into place,
which is why the Maoist problem is still somewhat contained.
Proxy Wars in Pakistan: Baloch Focus
Now, move to Baluchistan,
which is the main site of India’s
proclaimed proxy war in Pakistan.
The British and Americans also have strong interest in creating an independent
Baluchistan, not to mention Iran’s
interest because Baluchistan is predominantly Shia, like Iran. British Prime Minister
Tony Blair apparently put the idea into America’s ear that having an
independent Baluchistan would solve America’s overland route problem into
Afghanistan. The British SIS (or MI6) consequently initiated clandestine
action with the CIA post 10/11 to foment rebellion in Baluchistan, once
American troops displaced the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Hence requisite
2 went into action. The numerical size of the rebels was relatively small when
the Western powers started, but that got built to some 4-6,000 rebels, about
the size of two brigades, and enough to cause turmoil, blow up army depots,
harass military convoys, and launch surprise attacks at military bases.
Seeing an upswing in Baluch rebellion in 2004, Musharraf sent in one division
and two brigades to quash the rebellion. Soon, the octogenarian leader of
Baluchistan, Nawab Akbar Bugti,
Oxford-educated, and a former Governor of Baluchistan, was assassinated by
Musharraf in 2006, who claimed it a victory for the Pakistani people1.
In 2007, the Pakistani army resorted to indiscriminate civilian attacks in the
regions of Kahan and Dera Bugti; over 200 houses were razed, and more than 100
civilians, women and children killed. In addition, Pakistani forces poured into
more than a dozen cities to suppress pro-independence protests; the army
further used helicopter gunships and carpet bombed entire villages in Kahan,
Taratani and Kamalan Kech areas. Dozens of Baluch were shot dead in cold blood
by executing squads, 400 were arrested, another 500 were kidnapped. The human
rights violations were appalling.2
Indian covert action in Baluchistan is
fair tit-for-tat for Pakistani proxy wars in India. India should not be left wanting in
its own security concerns.
In 2012, nearly 1,000 people were
officially known killed in Baluchistan, in a province of only 8 million
people, even though it occupies 44% of the land area of Pakistan. The daughter and
grand-daughter of Bugti were slaughtered in their car in the streets of Karachi, to send a
gruesome message to Bugti’s grandson, Brahmadagh, the leader of the Baluch
Republican Party. It appears that the rebellion is weighted in the
opposite direction to what intended: rebel groups and sympathizers are being
slaughtered by home security forces rather than the other way around. Nevertheless,
after Musharraf’s departure to England,
an FIR was issued against him for the murder of Akbar Bugti. Musharraf
will still have to face the music after he returns on March 24, 2013 to Pakistan.
Thus, the uprisings, revolts, and
rebellions continue in Baluchistan
today. MI6 and CIA are interested in carving the country of Baluchistan,
in which they find themselves as strange bedfellows with Iran, with the same end interest,
but for a different reason. For Iran,
it’s a question of creating a larger Shia conglomerate; for the Americans and
British it is to have an overland route to Afghanistan,
as well as have a physical base from where to monitor Pakistani nuclear
movements; for India,
it is simply a matter to break-up and weaken an arch enemy. India is assumed to provide assistance to the
Baluch, an action that India
need not be ashamed of, though Pakistan
tried to shame India
in this matter in the famous 2009 joint statement between Yousuf Raza Gilani
and Manmohan Singh.5
Creating a proxy war in Baluchistan to severe it from Pakistan is in the direct interest of India.
First, the mineral-rich province will then no longer provide resources and
riches to Pakistan,
an event that will directly deplete Pakistani military expenditure. While
Baluchistan is easily Pakistan’s
richest province, its people are its poorest, mainly because Pakistan has exploited Baluchistan
like a colony. The human rights excesses by Pakistan
in Baluchistan are enough of a moral reason to assist and aid the Baluch in
segregating from Pakistan.
But more than that, Pakistan
has been enough of an enemy of India
to attract India’s
legitimate and moral wrath. Finally, Indian covert action in Baluchistan
is fair tit-for-tat for Pakistani proxy wars in India. India should not be left wanting in
its own security concerns. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is
fair policy. But India
needs to brook no nonsense, and like every other country in its place, has the
moral right to react disproportionately: Two eyes for one; and the whole jaw
for a tooth!
Brief History of Baluchistan
Baluchistan consists of a
western province in Iran, a northern province in Afghanistan,
and a central province in Pakistan.
They speak a dialect distantly related to the Kurdish people. Ironically, the
Baluch are deprived of a nation just like the Kurds, who are also divided
across three countries. In the 19th century, the Persians and British agreed to
divide Baluchistan into a Persian sector, an Afghan province, and an
independent central state that served as a vassal state to Great Britain,6 much
like Kashmir. These vassal states
protected Great Britain from
invasions from the West and North, especially considering that they entered
into a separate agreement with Russia
to keep Afghanistan
as a virtual no-man’s land. Thus, Britain’s
borders to the north and west against the major empires of the time – Russia, Persia,
and a potential China
were secure. Tibet was
an added buffer against both Russian and Chinese invasions, remembering that Chengiz Khan had come into North India through Tibet and Afghanistan,
while Russia had expanded
southwards into Central Asia during the major
part of the early 19th century.
At Indian independence in
1947, Baluchistan, like Kashmir, was kept out of the India-Pakistan equation,
and both Kashmir and Baluchistan were left as independent, sovereign states by Britain, with Britain
actually recognizing Baluchistan as a
sovereign state. But, on March 26, 1948, 300 years of Baluch autonomy
came to a striking end when the Pakistani army walked in, much like India walked into Hyderabad. That India recognized Pakistani occupation of
Baluchistan was probably in reciprocity to Pakistani recognition of India’s occupation of Hyderabad.
The total rebel strength is still not
estimated at more than 5,000 armed fighters – perhaps as low as 2,000.
This number is much too small to sustain an effective armed uprising.
Arab nationalists in Iraq, Syria,
and Egypt
began to support Baloch independence in the 1950s. Iraq renewed its support of Iranian
Baloch during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. Very logically, Russia supported Pakistani Baloch during their
occupation of Afghanistan,
1979-1989. Ahmad Akbar Bugti rose to prominence in the 1990s, galvanized
Baloch resistance, but was squarely eliminated by Musharraf in the 2000s.
Harsh repressions against Baloch nationals, presumed rebels, and sympathizers
continues today by Pakistani security forces, thereby further alienating the
sentiments of the Baloch people. But the Baloch people simply are a small
population and suffer from inadequate external assistance to carve their independence.
This, in a nutshell, is the Baloch history. In all this, it must not be
forgotten that the Baloch are an independent group of people who have had their
own country in the past; they are a sovereign people who want to see an end to Punjabi
exploitation from Islamabad,
and now rightfully seek their own free nation.
Implementation of the Baloch Proxy War
So, inasmuch as India
needs to foment Baloch rebellion, let’s apply the four principle requisites to
the problem. First, there
are an insufficient number of Baloch rebels available who will fight for independence.
The total rebel strength is still not estimated at more than 5,000 armed
fighters – perhaps as low as 2,000. This number is much too small to
sustain an effective armed uprising. In contrast, the Free Syrian Army
has a maximum of 50,000 fighters,7 including
deserters from the Syrian Army, but is still in a tough face-off with the
Syrian Army, which is much smaller and less professional than the Pakistani
army.
In comparison, the
Pakistani army is 450,000 strong, and so Pakistan can very easily suppress
any armed rebellion by 2,000 Baloch rebels. That the people of Baluchistan may suffer in the process or that the
province may become poorer is not of concern to Pakistani Punjabis. All
that the Pakistani Punjabis want are the minerals and resources of Baluchistan, the rest being damned. Hence, an armed
rebellion in Baluchistan may not be more than a bee sting for Pakistan that Pakistan can easily shrug and
forget.
Pakistani resolve to retain Baluchistan is firm. Pakistan’s ISI and military is
pro-active in weeding possible Baloch rebels, often kidnapping innocent men and
women in the process.
Thus we see that requisite
1 is difficult to fulfil, notwithstanding British, American, Iranian, and
Indian wishes in the matter. Requisite 2 is hard to come by, because effective weaponry is not
being given yet, in
spite of what people may believe. The Western powers are forever wary
that their assistance may fall into the wrong hands. India’s hardware assistance is
miniscule. Russian assistance stopped in 1989, even though the Russians
first raised the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA). But, with RAW and RAD (Russian Intelligence)
help, America
trained some 30 Baluch fighters in 2002 that RAW helped select. But anyone can understand that 30
fighters is a pitiable joke for a huge province! Other reports claim that
numerous training camps have come up across Pakistan, but how many
fighters do they produce? Thirty per camp in ten camps? This is still an
extremely small number to stir a rebellion. The numbers of camps that
have been discovered and destroyed by Pakistani forces are also significant, so
India’s
results are certainly not 100%, but closer to 50%, in all likelihood.
Thus, the proxy war situation
is even more pathetic than expected. The deaths and assaults reported for
Baluchistan are of Baloch by Taliban and
Pakistani security forces rather than the other way around. Baloch rebel assaults on Pakistani
military forces are all but non-existent. If the rebellion were meaningful
and strong, more Pakistani military casualties would be registered. Foreign weapon assistance, including from India,
is minimal. The assistance from America
and Britain
has slid to lip-service and hearings at the US Congress. The action on the
ground is far from meaningful. The rhetoric, as usual, especially in
Indian security analysis circles is hyped up. They catch a mouse and claim to have caught a tiger!
This is typical Indian personality, characterized by some degree of
inferiority. The truth is that the Baloch proxy war is close to dreaming
of action but having none of it; impotence is a better way to characterize
it. India
knows how to count its chickens, but not hatch them.
On the other hand,
Pakistani resolve to retain Baluchistan is
firm. Pakistan’s
ISI and military is pro-active in weeding possible Baloch rebels, often
kidnapping innocent men and women in the process. “In the period from 2003-2012
it is estimated that 8,000 people were kidnapped by Pakistani security forces
in the province. In 2008 alone an estimated 1,102 Baloch people
disappeared. There have also been [widespread] reports of torture.”11 These reports widely resemble Indian army actions
in Nagaland in the 1960s and Punjab in the 1980s, and even now both those
provinces are firmly in Indian Territory.
Pakistan has systematically eliminated members of the BLA and other would-be
rebels, even though General Kakar, former Chief of Army of Staff of Pakistan,
called Musharraf’s actions in killing Bugti a mistake.12 The will of the Pakistani political and
military machinery to squash Baloch rebellion is strong; this thereby indicates
that requisite 3 is not adequate for a rebellion to succeed.
Thus, requisites 1, 2, and 3 are wanting. However,
it is possible to tilt these by using requisite 4 in such a way that it
overcomes all other requisites. Thus, by the Indian army opening its guns
all along the 1,850 mile Indo-Pak border, and stepping up weapon supplies to
the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA), much as it did to the Mukti Bahini, India can
hope to tie down Pakistani forces on its Eastern front, while military
installations in Baluchistan can be torched by rebels, and bombarded by Indian
naval gunships and missile ships. Much as India loaned
its Bengali officers and soldiers to the Mukti Bahini in 1971, it may have to
do something similar with the BLA, albeit in a different shape. Again, Indian Special Forces and
Marcos can be a great asset here, though the Indian establishment can brainstorm
other options. Cooperation with Iran in this respect must not be
ruled out, but must be negotiated. USA
and Britain
must be more closely consulted. For instance, Iran
could press troops on the Baluchistan border, or US troops could come down into
Quetta in Baluchistan from Kandahar,
even if these are distant dreams, because the USA
is simply scared to send troops into Pakistan for various military,
economic, and political reasons. Nevertheless, without external military
intervention it is difficult to see how Pakistan will relinquish control
over a huge, mineral-rich province.
Eventually, the paltry Indian assistance
to the Baloch Liberation Army must increase by gargantuan amounts for the
liberation action to succeed.
The execution of the proxy
war will also require allocation of a special status by the Indian cabinet and
a large budget to go with it. Hence, requisites 1, 2, and 4 can be ramped up
and the will of resistance that is in requisite 3 can be gradually broken by
the measures mentioned. This is how the proxy war can succeed; else its
success is only in the imagination of dreamers, because even a weak and
fatigued Pakistan will not
relinquish its hold on Baluchistan.
Conclusion
Four requisites for the
success of a proxy war were outlined, and examples given from world
situations. In conclusion, it sounds unlikely that a proxy war as
currently being waged by India
or the Western powers in Baluchistan can severe Baluchistan from Pakistan,
even though they need it for their strategic interests. The four
requisites to make this happen in Baluchistan simply don’t seem to exist, and Pakistan’s will to retain Baluchistan
is strong. However, the deficiency in requisites can be overcome if India
ties down Pakistani forces along the Indo-Pak border after opening its guns in
fire along the entire 1,850 mile border. This must be supplemented by
loaning Special Forces soldiers and officers to the Baloch National Army to
damage and destroy Pakistani installations in Baluchistan.
Eventually, the paltry Indian assistance to the Baloch Liberation Army must
increase by gargantuan amounts for the liberation action to succeed. In
the end, a freedom fight and proxy war in Baluchistan is morally justified for
the human rights abuses and excesses by Islamabad
in Baluchistan. It is undeniable that a
successful proxy war in Baluchistan is in India’s strategic interest. This proxy war can be fought overtly as well
as covertly because India
has been at war with Pakistan
for 65 years.++
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