The News
By Lieutenant General (Retd.) Ali Kuli Khan Khattak
I have recently read General Musharraf's book In The Line Of Fire and like many others, I also have discovered its numerous lies, half truths and misleading statements. Lies do good to no-one, least of all a person who claims to be the democratically elected President of Pakistan and quite readily arrogates to himself the leadership of the Ummah. Also disappointing was the discovery of the self serving, motivated and false aspersions against my person. One had hoped that with the passage of time and with exposure to high positions, he would have shed his complexes, but this is obviously not so.
Given below are some details to support my assertions:-
* On Page 41: It is written "I was one of four candidates short-listed to go to Sandhurst, England, to complete my training ...."
Comments: This is patently untrue; the five Cadets selected by the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) and sent for interview/final selection to GHQ did not include Cadet Pervez Musharraf. The five Cadets selected by PMA for interview at GHQ were Shabbir Sharif, Afzal Malik, Khalid Nawaz, Zahur Afridi and Ali Kuli.
May I (without undue modesty) add that Ali Kuli was finally selected and did exceptionally well and was the first Pakistani Cadet to be made a Senior Under Officer at Sandhurst; an achievement which remains unequalled till date. I was also declared the Best Overseas Cadet and by dint of my performance was placed at the top of 29th PMA Long Course; General Pervez Musharraf was placed 11th in the Order of Merit.
On Page 79: "....Yet instead of me, he selected Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan Khattak, who I felt was a mediocre Officer. I must confess I was quite surprised and disappointed."
Comments: This pertains to my appointment as CGS and is an untruthful remark; Gen Musharraf knows fully well that my career record was far better than his in every respect. I will not labour on this futile point too long, because the professional prowess of both of us is well known. Suffice to say that had my record not been better, given all the connections elaborated upon by General Musharraf in the earlier part of the paragraph under reference, General Karamat would surely have preferred him over me. Actually there is not one single year or facet of our careers in which his record was better than mine.
On Page 85 of the book; General Musharraf gives an account of how he learnt of his elevation to COAS and a mention is made of my conversation with him on this subject. Regrettably even this innocuous encounter is misreported and a proselytising attitude adopted. The true sequence of events were as follows:-
-- I learnt of General Musharraf's appointment on PTV. I immediately rang him in the Armour Mess and I said "PM congratulations and best of luck"; I added further, "I will not be going to GHQ and will be leaving for Peshawar in the morning". I suspect I was probably one of the earlier people to congratulate him when he reached the Armour Mess and I admit that I was not exactly thrilled at the developments! During this conversation, General Musharraf said nothing more than "OK thanks"; there was also no display of
magnanimity nor were there any conciliatory remarks from the newly appointed COAS who had superceded two senior colleagues; two days later, on return from Peshawar and in line with the time honoured tradition of the Army, I resigned. If General Musharraf is disappointed at my not having celebrated his elevation with greater gusto, then so be it, because I am much happier to be known for what I truly am and felt at the time.
-- As far as the remarks of "not speaking" or "not attending his dinners" are concerned, I again find them inaccurate. It is also true I did not attend the First Course Reunion after his elevation yet it is conveniently forgotten that I subsequently visited him twice at the Army House.
Firstly, when I condoled with him on the passing away of his late father and Secondly when I was invited to the Army House along with Dr Nasim Ashraf's Human Development Organization. Also conveniently forgotten is the fact that I have attended numerous Annual Course Reunions, including some at The Presidency where Gen Musharraf was a gracious host and I sat on the same table with him! Apart from the above mentioned events we have met briefly at many marriages and social occasions.
Finally, we all know that friendship is a two-way street whose success depends on both individuals. Since this is a season for complaining I am also taking the liberty of making some of my own. Why did General Musharraf not have the courtesy to reply to the note I sent after the second attempt on his life near Jhanda? The note contained only suggestions to improve his security arrangements and a response of a simple THANK YOU was all that it required.
On Page 79. "....I was third in seniority of Lieutenant Generals, though this happened because of some manipulation by the former Army Chief General Waheed Kakar to give advantage of first position to Ali Kuli ...."
Comments: This is another of General Musharraf's unending conspiracy theories! I wanted to ignore this remark because I know that the common reader is not interested in our career rivalries but I have chosen to respond briefly because General Musharraf has tried to malign a respected soldier who is unlikely to respond.
In his remarks General Musharraf is probably alluding to extensions of service granted to Officers during General Waheed's tenure as COAS. In order to understand the reasons why these extensions were given, it is necessary to keep in perspective the situation at the time of General Waheed's appointment. In January 1993, the late General Asif Nawaz died rather suddenly because of cardiac arrest when he had barely completed one out of his three years tenure. This sudden demise of the COAS understandably disturbed the seniority system in Pak Army. In order to reduce the impact of the unexpected death of his predecessor General Waheed
was gracious enough to request two of his course mates (whom he had superceded) to continue serving; both of them agreed and served on.
Similarly, a couple of other officers, in accordance with a well discussed and declared GHQ policy and approval of the Government, were given extensions of a year or so, so as to ensure that Defence Officers do not retire too young. Finally, during General Waheed's tenure, two Lieutenant Generals were retired prematurely, which had impacted the promotional structure.
How General Musharraf considers this as a manipulation to deny him the position of being the senior most Lt General at the time of selection of the COAS defies logic. If this allegation were true, then General Waheed from day one would have to know not only that his superceded course mates would agree to serve on but also that he had decided to prematurely retire two other Lieutenant Generals.
These are surely the workings of an obsessive mind. In fact, not only are they baseless and illogical but what is particularly galling is that they have been made against a noble person known for his honesty and integrity.
On pages 82 to 85 in this book there are extensive references to General Ali Kuli with the accusations that, in numerous conferences at GHQ, I was a self-serving hawk who because of my self-promotion wanted to oust Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and continuously pushed for an Army takeover. The evidence for these allegations comes from four conferences in Pindi, in two of which the great Gen Musharraf was not even present, but my misdeeds were dutifully reported to him.
My comments on these allegations are very simple. These conferences were never held to discuss whether the Army should take over or not and as such the question of recommending it never arose. What I did say always was that the Army must maintain a firm and fair posture and I stand by this even today. Geeral Karamat's aversion (as indeed that of his predecessor) to an Army takeover was well-known and is supported by his actions.
But what is incongruous is the fact that a person who was such a strong supporter of democracy suddenly flipped when his own person was involved. Suddenly democracy became sham and we now have a messiah who will lead us to his version of promised true democracy in accordance with his own oft modified programme. It also suggests the presence of a private intelligence
system which reported happenings at GHQ and makes one wonder whether such reporting went even higher?
Kargil: In Chapter 11 of this rather controversial book the author decides to step into the biggest minefield when he brazenly refers to the Kargil Operations as "considered purely, in military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of Pakistan Army". I am totally amazed at such ostrich-like behaviour when the whole world considers Kargil to be the worst debacle in Pakistan's history and where countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing. Absolutely nothing!
In this book, a totally futile debate is started by making allegations against the political leadership. Allegations can only be made against others when one's own work is above par and not when there are gaping holes in it. I regret to say that the conception and planning at the highest level had been poor; in fact so poor that the only word which can adequately describe it is unprofessional. We all know that the main duty of the high command is to ensure that with their meticulous planning they create conditions whereby their junior combatants can fight easy. This was certainly not done at Kargil.
It is also fairly obvious that the Kargil Operations were not conceived in its totality, with the result that apart from bringing ignominy to
Pakistan it also caused unnecessary misery to a lot of innocent people. The account of General Musharraf regarding Kargil is inconsistent and has raised more questions than it has answered! We must have a full blown independent inquiry into the Kargil debacle.
In the end, I would like to state that I am not prone to any discourse which casts aspersions on others But, at the same time, I am not one who will present the other cheek! Unfortunately, in this sordid affair a stone was cast by someone and unless I responded, many who do not know us, would have taken it for the truth and hence the need of this rebuttal.
I served for 37 years in the Pakistan Army and retired in October 1998, as the Chief of General Staff (CGS). Interestingly enough, immediately prior to being the CGS, I had been Commander 10 Corps and Director General Military Intelligence and as such was privy to most events which have been discussed. I could say a great deal more on most of these subjects but, since it goes against the spirit of national security, the whole issue needs to be put to rest.
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