Described by a former CIA director as 'at least as dangerous as Osama
bin Laden,' A Q Khan to BBC journalist Gordon Corera is at once
'a fascinating and disturbing person.'

'Here was an individual ready to proliferate to any country that was
ready to pay -- including North Korea, Libya and Iran,' Corera writes in
his riveting and revealing book, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear
Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the AQ Khan
Network. 'And for the first time a dangerous array of products was
available entirely in the private sector.'

Still a hero to many Pakistanis who revere him as the Father of the
Nuclear Bomb, 69-year-old Khan, who was born in Bhopal and migrated to
Pakistan when he was 13, is under apparent house arrest in his country
for building a global clandestine network that sold nuclear secrets to
Iran, North Korea, and Libya.

In his book published by Oxford University Press, Corera reveals how
Khan 'operated within a world of shadowy deals among rogue States and
how his privileged position in Pakistan provided him with the protection
to build his unique and deadly business empire.'

The book also explains why and how he was able to operate so freely
for so many years, thanks to American and Pakistani cooperation to fight
the Russians first, and after 9/11, Al Qaeda. It also offers many
insights into A Q Khan, the pioneer of nuclear black marketeering.

Corera says his book provides the first detailed account of the
American and British high-wire dealings with Libyan ruler Muammar
Gadaffi, which led to Libya's renunciation of nuclear weapons in 2003
and which played a key role in Khan's downfall.

In an exclusive interview with Rediff India Abroad Managing
Editor (Features) Arthur J Pais, Corera speaks about the making
of the book, and notes that 'the final answers lie with a man who is
very sick, who is under house arrest in Islamabad, and out of touch with
the outside world.'

There are some people who believe that A Q Khan's main reason for
building the nuclear bomb was his animosity towards India. Would this be
correct?

It is true that India was the factor that started him off. When he
saw the picture of the Pakistani army surrendering to the Indian army (in
Dhaka on December 16, 1971), he told himself that he would not let
such a thing happen again. He was in Europe at that time trained as a
metallurgist and he offered his services to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

It was in 1974, following India's testing of a 'peaceful nuclear
explosive, that Khan's career as a nuclear scientist began. It was also
in that year he started as a spy and a thief of nuclear secrets. But
Khan was perhaps more motivated by his anger against the West,
especially when the opposition to Pakistan's secret nuclear programme
was building up. By 1979 he was more obsessed with the West than India.

You mention in the book a letter he wrote to the German magazine
Der Spiegel in 1979. Would you tell us more about it?

It is a very important letter and shows his strongest motive perhaps
to build the bomb. He questioned in that letter 'the bloody
holier-than-thou attitudes of the Americans and the British. 'These
bastards are God-appointed guardians of the world,' the letter
complained, 'to stockpile hundreds of thousands of nuclear warheads and
have the God-given authority of carrying out explosions every month. But
if we start a modest programme, we are the Satans, the devils.'

How far did he see the bomb as an Islamic bomb?

Khan was a religious man but he was not a fundamentalist. He married
a person of Dutch-South African origin. He consulted fortune-tellers. He
served liquor to his foreign guests though he himself did not drink.
Like Bhutto, he too saw the bomb in terms of nationalist pride and
security.

If he looked at it purely as an Islamic bomb as he grew older and
became more successful, he would not have sold the nuclear secrets and
instruments to North Korea.

Look at the Islamic countries that received secrets from him. Both
Iran and Libya were well known for their opposition to the West. So once
again, Khan was fighting the West, through North Korea, Iran and Libya.
So it was not simply about Islam and a pan-Islamic movement.

It is also true that over time, he began to see Pakistan as the
centre of the Islamic world, thanks to his bomb to a great extent. His
close associate Zahid Malik wrote in Khan's biography that the latter
wanted to see the Islamic world rise above other nations, and in that
Islamic world Pakistan would be pre-eminent.

In all this, I believe he was a Pakistani patriot and nationalist
first and a Muslim internationalist second.

What led the idealist to become a rogue scientist?

Many people say it was greed. But there was certainly much more to
it. Khan was so powerful in Pakistan that he could have made much more
money from the government. Call it misplaced idealism, the secret sale
of nuclear knowledge was part of his war against the West. He was
convinced that the West wanted to destroy Pakistan. The sale was also
part of his ego.

In the 1980s he had become amazingly powerful and privileged in
Pakistan. His ego was well fed. And so was his power. He saw himself as
someone who could defy the world and have his own way. Many people hated
the nuclear non-proliferation system but only Khan could bring it down.

You believe that after Jinnah, he is the only national hero
Pakistan has had. Why is it so?

He cultivated that image and others cultivated it for him, too. The
insecurity of the country fed that image, too. It is also true that
while politicians do not have unanimous backing of the people, Khan was
seen as a nonpartisan scientist who was not only building the bomb but
also enhancing the image and security of Pakistan.

You also write that many established scientists in Pakistan
resented that Khan was called the Father of the Nuclear Bomb. How do you
see him?

He certainly developed and nurtured Pakistan's nuclear programme, and
his uranium enrichment programme, and the secrets he stole from the
nuclear facilities in The Netherlands, all helped towards the building
of the bomb. The bomb was far from being a single handed job. So the
country's nuclear establishment found it insulting that one man was
bestowed the honor. The mythmaking had gone too far, many top scientists
felt.

Could it have occurred to Khan that if the bomb was unleashed on
India, millions of Muslims could have been affected too?

I have talked to many people who are close to Khan. Their view of the
nuclear bomb -- and that could be partly Khan's too -- was that it was a
means of stability and not danger. Having the bomb made a war less
likely with India. Of course, many people would dispute this.

India and Pakistan nearly came to a war in 2002 following the
attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-backed militants. What did
Khan feel about the conflict?

Many people in South Asia, and many politicians and analysts in the
West believed that the threat of nuclear destruction stopped the war.
Khan's fame within Pakistan began to grow even more.

Ironically the West was going after him, gathering evidence of his
sale of nuclear information to North Korea, Libya and Iran. But in
Pakistan Khan was seen as a hero for having brought 'security' to the
country through its nuclear arsenal. And he himself believed so.

Your book says many people who knew Khan in the 1970s are
surprised, even shocked, to see him grow as a scientist and a powerful
man.

He was a modest person and it looked like he had modest goals for
himself. But the humiliation Pakistan went through after its defeat in
1971 began changing things dramatically for Khan --- and for Pakistan
itself.

He certainly had the ability to win over people, isn't it?

Khan was a people person. His skills as a businessman were more
important than the skills as a scientist. His ability to build a network
of loyal friends including German and Dutchmen who broke the law even
when they knew they were helping to build the bomb is remarkable.

The West had put pressure on President Musharraf to hold Khan
responsible for the nuclear blackmarket and yet it took Musharraf a long
time to get the infamous confession from Khan.

In 2003 when the pressure began mounting on Musharraf to get rid of
Khan, the latter went around hinting that he had a lot of incriminating
information against the army and the civilian rulers. Nobody knows what
exactly he had. In any event, even after he confessed to Musharraf and
then to the nation about his secret nuclear deals, there was no doubt he
did so only because he was sure of a deal.

He knew the incriminating information against him could not be
denied. But given his prestige and power, he had made sure that he would
get a pardon, that he would be under house arrest and that he would not
be handed over to the Americans.

Given his cocky attitude and pride why did he break down before
Musharraf in January 2004 and confessed to the nation?

Because of the fact that it was not just any army officer who was
dealing with him. Here was the most powerful politician in the country
and Musharraf was showing him the definite proof of his (Khan's)
transactions. Till then he had refused to believe that he could be ever
stopped. His ego was so big that he just could not imagine anyone had
the courage to stop him.

When Musharraf told him it was all over, all of a sudden the edifice
he had constructed over the years collapsed.

What made Musharraf act decisively against Khan?

For quite some time (before January 2004), Musharraf has
been clipping Khan's wings. I don't think the two men really liked each
other. Pressure had been building on Musharraf to act against Khan
especially as Libya was abandoning its nuclear programme and definite
proof of Khan's role in that programme was coming to light.

By the middle of 2003, America had definite evidence of Khan's
involvement in the nuclear programmes in Iran and North Korea. But
Musharraf too was afraid to act against Khan because of the latter's
popularity and prestige within the country. It was only when Colin
Powell, the then US secretary of state, spoke to Musharraf things began
to move fast and dramatically.

How did Powell get Musharraf to change his mind?

Powell and Musharraf had a very good working relationship for a long
time. Powell called Musharraf at the end of January 2004, saying: We are
now going to talk general to general. If Musharraf did not act
decisively, Powell warned, President Bush would make a speech soon about
Khan's hand in nuclear proliferation in Libya. Powell also said: You may
want to -- and I strongly recommend that you do -- act. Within a few
days Khan was under house arrest.

What was the biggest challenge in researching this book?

It covers more than 30 years of nuclear proliferation history and it
spans many countries including North Korea. To get to the bottom of this
highly secretive world is not easy. Of course, I could not meet with
Khan but I did go to Pakistan and I did try to meet with him. Many
people in Pakistan did not want to speak about him and the nuclear
programme, though some people spoke off the record.

Some of Khan's friends spoke to me, and it was very important to
listen to them because their views shed light on his thinking, his
behaviour and his motivation. And yet there are many unanswered questions in this book.