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Pak-Army's mindset Dr Ghayur Ayub
To get into the mindset of an army general like Pervaiz Musharaf we have to go back to 1952 and read a dispatch of Mr. Gibson, the American Consul General, Karachi. Writing about General Ayub he says, "He (Ayub) stated that the Pakistan Army will not allow the political leaders to get out of hand," (1). In another conversation in 1953 Mr. Gibson records, "The army would declare a military government in order to secure stability." That was the time when Pakistan was just five years old and its public was recovering from a tormenting experience of tortures from mass migration. The politicians, after loosing their leader and the greatest democrat, were finding their feet on the ground, while their army Chief was thinking how to discipline them. Such was the army attitude born with the birth of Pakistan. General Ayub decided to use fear as a tool for his planning and found it in Ch Mohammad Ali, which was installed in his makeup while working in Indian Civil Service. He was a civilian bureaucrat who created the post of Secretary General to maintain what he called "˜the effective liaison between the cabinet on one hand and the administration on the other'. (2 Furthermore, to enlarge the civil service base he included military personnel into civil administration. He was helped by Sikandar Mirza, who himself was an ambitious bureaucrat with army background. Mirza's thoughts equated with that of General Ayub's when one reads him saying "masses of this country are overwhelming illiterate. They are not interested in politics." (3) and the "people of this country need controlled democracy for time to come." (4) As opposed to such statements, the founder of Pakistan had this to say in an interview in London on 14 October 1944. "It (Pakistan) is the Muslim's demand for freedom because Muslims in Pakistan want to be able to establish their own real democratic popular government." (5) About the army role in politics he could not be clearer than what he told the Gazetted Army Officers at Chittagong on March 25, 1948, "You have to do your duty as servants; you are not concerned with this or that political party; that is not your business. Whichever (party) gets the majority will form the government and your duty is to serve the government as servant"¦as servant and not politician." (6)
Instead of following the wishes of Jinnah, the top bureaucracy and the military created a nexus which was going to strangulate the real democracy through intrigues and backdoor manipulations. As a result when India was progressing smoothly on the path of democracy, Pakistan was struggling to overcome the repeated onslaughts by the nexus from 1950 to 1958. Writing about that period Cheema stated, "Pakistan had seven prime ministers and one Commander-in- Chief where as India had one Prime minister and several Commanders-in- Chief." (7) This was indeed a sad beginning of a country which was founded by the greatest believer in democracy. In the process of weakening the democracy and suffocating the essentials that made its mosaic, the intriguers successfully disenchanted people about politicians. Some politicians fell in the trap and let the ailing democracy suffer, strengthening the public misconceptions created against them. It was in 1954 when a bureaucrat governor general, Mr. Ghulam Ahmad dismissed the Constituent Assembly. The real reason?
The Assembly passed budgetary proposals initiated by the bureaucrats of the government in which one third of the defense budget was reduced. According to Allan McGarth, "This was an unprecedented move, and was bound to alarm Ayub and the army." (8) By that time the army had grown in power and influence and played on the sentiments that India was a credible threat to the existence of Pakistan affecting not only the public and politicians but the judiciary as well. So, on March 21, 1955, the Judiciary gave a blank check by upholding the dissolution, when Tamizzuddin Khan challenged the dismissal in Federal Court of Pakistan. As Hamid Khan, put it, "the judgment paved the way for future justifications by the judiciary of patently arbitry acts of the executive on hyper-technical grounds." (9) Also, that was the first time, Army Chief Ayub Khan acted as political mediator, even arbitrator in a government crisis when he approached Tamizzuddin's attorney to withdraw the court petition and go for a political settlement. Furthermore, the influence of army-bureaucracy nexus over politicians becomes more obvious when the second Constituent Assembly (after the dismissal of first) was indirectly elected through the "˜electoral college of the provincial assemblies of Pakistan, which subsequently passed the 1956 Constitution vesting "˜extra-ordinary powers in the President' despite the constitution' s claim of adherence to a parliamentary form of government. (10) Ayub Khan the army Chief was made Defense Minister, and as Hamid Khan put it again, "this was the beginning of the end of supremacy of civilians over the military power." The true democracy was arrowed and it kept on limping under the shadow of powerful bureaucracy- army linkage until 1958.
On 7th October 1958 President Sikandar Mirza abrogated the Constitution of 1956, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, banned all political parties and declared Martial Law. In a broadcast to the nation on 8th October, General Ayub, the Chief Martial Law Administrator told the nation that he wanted to restore a democracy "˜of a type that people could understand and work'. (11)He was hinting at the "˜controlled democracy' first coined by his friend Sikandar Mirza and which five years later, was going to take shape as "˜basic democracy'
The Court's decision to legitimize the military coup of 1958 was resonant of the earlier ruling endorsing Governor General Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954. It, followed the precedence of Han Kelsen's General Theory of Law and State, which states, "˜a successful coup detat is an internationally recognized legal method of changing the Constitution' . (12)
The question is what were the reasons for dismissal? Writing in The Dawn on April 28, 2001 Anwar Syed stated, "None of the seven Prime Ministers during this period (1951-1958) was accused of graft. The governments were unstable with reference to Prime Minister's identity but not in relation to the substance of public policy, which was shaped largely by higher civil servants, who remained secure and stable both in their posts and in orientations." So it was not corruption or economic reasons which made General Ayub decide pack up an elected government. Writing identically Jahan states, (13) "Long before the coup the military had been working as a silent partner in the civil-military bureaucratic coalition that held the key decision-making power in the country". So what was the actual reason and what did this nexus want? According to the declassified British and US documents, "by May 19, 1958 five months before the first Martial Law, President Sikandar Mirza and Gen. Ayub Khan separately told the American Ambassador that only dictatorship would work in Pakistan." (14) The documents also mention that the 1958 military coup was executed to prevent the elections from taking place in the first place as noted in a dispatch of August 23, 1958, "he (Mirza) told me (the High Commissioner) frankly that if the elections returns showed that a post-elected government was likely to be dominated by undesirable elements he would himself intervene" (15) It was clear, he was hinting at the democratic force of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan as "˜undesirable element'. In another dispatch the High Commissioner says, "The president if he can help it will not allow elections to be held, and he has in mind a personal coup with army support." (16) This is also confirmed by Bilal Hashmi when he wrote, "the main reason for the military coup (of October 1958) seems to be the civil and military elite's overriding desire to prevent Pakistan's first ever election from taking place in February 1959" (17) And according to Khalid B Sayeed, "Mirza and Ayub were the two dominant leaders of civil-military oligarchy that had decided that Pakistan could be governed best by tightening the grip of theses two institutions on its government and its people". (18)
Sikandar Mirza didn't know that General Ayub had something else in his mind. This gets clearer by yet another dispatch of October 9, 1958 which states, "Ayub as a supreme commander is in effective control of armed forces, which are the regime's only sanction"¦at present he (Ayub) is finding his feet but when he does so and understands more clearly the power of his command and opportunity before him, the strain on his loyalty to the president might be put to the test." (19) And that strain was put to the test within twenty days after the coup when he exiled Mirza and himself became the President.
The army, after meddling with politics for previous eight years in the background, was on its way to ride a political horse on the road of controlled democracy. Goodin correctly assessed the military role when he wrote, "there are two themes related to the role of Pakistan military in politics. To work in the background as catalytic intriguer and keep the incumbent government weak and unstable or help bringing it down through martial law with announcement that it would bring a sustainable democracy and improved economic situation to the country." (20) This rhetoric which was bellowed by General Ayub has been repeated by each military usurper for 38 years out of total history of 56.
The question is why a single voice of disapproval did not come from the public each time the army took over? Mr. Feldman also raises this point in his book "˜Revolution in Pakistan' by saying "the fact is that after Martial Law was promulgated not a single voice, defending lost liberty, was heard. No one raised a hand; not a barricade was mounted." (21)
There were four main reasons for this inaction. First, the army systemically and effectively damaged the image of politicians by keeping the political governments weak and shaky. Second, with each take-over, they promised to bring social change by improving law and order, economy, good governance, and reducing poverty and unemployment. Thirdly they knew about solidarity in the ranks and files of armed forces and no one could afford to oppose them. That fear was confirmed when Gen. Zia openly flogged his opponents. On top of that the generals made sure that they kept the army hierarchy financially sound during their service and after retirement. Thus 1958 coup showered them with unprecedented perks and privileges, not seen in the history of civil servants and 1977 coup extended their jobs to civil service and semi-autonomous bodies by introducing 10% quota, (22) a practice common in Chile military experience. Fourthly, the army always maintained high image in public eyes. This image improved tremendously in 1965 war.
In 1971, their image fell to lowest level when Pakistan lost 54% of its portion in a war and surrendered 95,000 of its army to the enemy. It was a civilian prime minister who rescued them from greatest humiliation. But when the same prime minister tried to bring the army under civilian control, he had to face gallows. How come a demoralized army became so powerful within a short span of six years to coup against a strong prime minister? I believe, the civilian government made a fatal mistake by involving ISI in political affairs not realizing that its primary loyalties were with the army not with civilians. Secondly, the then prime minister had included the military leadership in discussions of his government strategy and even invited them to cabinet meetings. (23) Thirdly, to overcome its deficiencies, in 1971, the army built National Defense College which became the hub of character building while teaching, among other things, how to be part of gradual involvement of military in civilian activities. (24) What they taught in the college came out in a shape of the Green Book 2000 two decades later. It is equated with the Red Book of Mao by some enthusiast generals. Thirty nine officers of high ranks contributed to the book, which can safely be counted as reflective of army mindset. It concentrates on nation building and military's contribution in political, social and economic spheres. When it comes to discussing the political development in Pakistan and military leadership's perception of the state of affairs, it blames civil governments for their political and economic mismanagement, inefficiency, corruption and law and order situation. According to Mazhar, every word in this book reminds the readers (who are the military officers) that military is far more superior to the civilians and that the civilians should not be trusted. (25)
According to Douglas Bland if someone wants to have a peep into civilian military relation of a country he inquires in national defense ministry. (26) In Pakistan the Ministry of Defense plays a limited role in formation of defense policy. It is so secretive that even Parliamentarians cannot question scrutiny over military. This is evident from a recent ruling of the Speaker of Pakistan's National Assembly stating, interalia, that the parliamentarians cannot speak against the armed forces of Pakistan in the Assembly. This ruling was given after the opposition members within the Assembly criticized the military leadership over a number of issues. The opposition leader, Javed Hashmi, was sent to jail for 23 years for speaking against army generals in the parliament house. (27)
Coming back to the coup of 1977; here was Pakistan after 32 years still finding it impossible to cling to real democracy. Could it be that a country which should have stood firmly on a democratic platform supported by three pillars of Legislative, Bureaucracy and Judiciary was deliberately made to fail in political field? The answer is in affirmative because as a result of meddling with politics, the army made itself the fourth pillar and became the strongest by eroding the other three. In the process it made us loose one half of the country in 1971. Instead of getting tamed, it methodically re-bounced again in 1977. After the coup, General Zia erected two more pillars to support his political platform; a religious pillar based on sectarian Islam to help Americans fight their war in Afghanistan and an ethnicity/regionali sm pillar based on language to have a check on Jamat Islami in Karachi. The religious pillar took advantage of the opportunity and made itself strong in weaponry and in mushrooming Madrissas. As they had enormous funds on their hands they targeted the poor of the society by giving their children free education, free lodging and in most cases pocket money. In a short span, because of army's wrong policies, the country became the hub of sectarianism and Karachi the ethnic killing field. It took an air crash to cut short an unending army rule, which was followed by a ten year unstable period of civil governments reminiscing the 1950s. This time five prime ministers changed hands. None of the elected governments completed their tenure as they were sacked because of army pressures exerted on the political actors.
Then came General Musharaf's adventurism in 1999 when he abrogated Constitution and suspended the Legislative Bodies. As usual, he repeated the same old allegations which his predecessors used in past. Speaking to Al-Jazeera on November 12, 1999 he argued "stabilization of economy is my number one priority. We have very poor economic conditions. Secondly we need to strengthen national integration, because there was a degree of provincial disharmony in Pakistan".
Six months prior to the coup, the World Bank published a report which stated, "The nuclear tests of May 1998, the economic sanctions that followed, and the related drying up most capital inflow led to severe financial difficulties. A combination of adroit domestic economic and financial management and international financial assistance have allowed Pakistan to come through the immediate crisis with drastic disruption of economic activities"¦.. Most important, Pakistan had an ongoing economic reform program since 1997 that helped mitigate the effects of the crisis. Pakistan had reduced its fiscal deficit from 7.1 percent of GDP in 1995/96 to 5.4 percent in 1997/98". (28)This report did not support Musharaf's claim of "˜very poor economic conditions' to bring a coup against a democratically elected government. Also, there was no evidence of disharmony between the provinces during Nawaz Sharif's regime. General Musharaf didn't strive to promote inter-provincial harmony. On the contrary, he created vast rift when his regime killed a popular Baluch leader in broad daylight and buried him with blatant disregard to local culture and Islamic values. So the reason was not the economic crisis or inter-provincial disharmony. It was something else.
According to Vali Nasr, "Between 1993 and 1999, the PML continued to push a mixture of business-friendly economic policies and nationalist- cum-Islamic appeals." He further says that "It was the PML's very success that set the stage for its fall. The Generals began to worry that the party's strategy-which we can now see was a rough-and-ready version of Muslim Democracy-would actually succeed. There followed Musharaf's 1999 coup against Sharif and the systemic dismantling, under the military tutelage, of the PML." According to him (and many other authors) "the 1999 military coup in Pakistan took place to safeguard the institutional interests of the military. These interests were in dangers of being undermined by an assertive civilian government"¦ It was Nawaz Sharif government which got away with the notorious Article 58 (B) putting the government on true civilian democratic path. Removal of this Amendment made the army weak politically so they had to remove Nawaz Sharif by giving the same reasons which were used for removal of Benazir Bhoto"”mismanagement, undermining the institution especially the army, among others." (29)
After General Musharaf's misadventure on Kargil and the subsequent withdrawal of the military through Bill Clinton's diplomacy, Bruce Riedel, a special assistant to President Clinton from 1997 to 2001, wrote about 1999 military takeover, "Nawaz Sharif was worried about his hold on power and the threat from his military chiefs"¦.He knew a military coup was coming. On October 12, 1999 it came..... Here is the complexity of civilian government's limited control over an influential military." Talking about Nawaz Sharif's stand on Kashmir he further said, "After Sharif's subsequent return to Pakistan, the Americans attempted to continue a level of mediation over the Kashmir problem but concluded that the situation within Pakistan was not conducive for Nawaz Sharif to move forwards on that front" (30) According to Vali Nasr, writing in the Middle East Journal, "it seems that the Kargil conflict itself was designed to undermine the civilian government". (31)
After 9.11, the same army which strengthened the religious pillar found itself at odds with it when General Musharaf took a U-turn in response to a telephonic call from Collin Powel. Initially the army used the religious group to get a favorable vote for 17th Amendment. Two years down the line, when he took another U-turn and refused to shun off his uniform, the crack widened between the two. From there on he started eroding the fifth pillar of religious group. This became obvious when Maulana Samiul Haq distanced himself from MMA. More recently an obvious rift is appearing between Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Qazi Hussain on the issues of NSC, future elections and mass movement. It is doing nothing but helping the general in his endeavor to erode the religious pillar. While this erosion is going on, he started strengthening the ethnic/regionalism pillar by making MQM stronger and persuading ANP to deviate from its principled stand on Afghanistan and Pushtunwalay. Asfandyar Wali's recent visit to the US under the tutelage of Afarsayab-a known pro-American, was part of that intent.
What General Musharaf doesn't understand is that while playing with politics he exposed his untrustworthiness to the public. He collected the corrupt bunch from the two major parties around him and made them as his A-Team. Not stopping there he involved military in every sphere of the society with the promise to bring good governance in the country. According to statistics, by 2003, 1027 active and retired armed forces officers had occupied the civilian positions in public sector including communication, foreign affair, education, information, establishment division (responsible for the promotion and posting of the civilian bureaucrats) , interior (responsible for police and law enforcement agencies), food and agriculture, information technology, petroleum and natural resources, science and technology, and revenue division etc. He even replaced a senior civil bureaucrat with a retired Lieutenant General to head the top civilian institution of Pakistan Administrative Staff College. This general was also named the project director of National School of Public Policy (NSPP) being set up for the capacity-building of the civilian bureaucrats. (32) Such an infiltration in civilian jobs was far more than the allowed quota of 10%. The penetration continues and is worse than it was in 2003.
Tariq Sultan the ex-chief of Pakistan Administrative Staff College in one of his "˜Interview' stated that "The present military regime in Pakistan likely had the Indonesian model of government in mind to be applied in this country. However, with the collapse of the Suharto regime, it has now turned its attention to adopting the Turkish model of government." (33) According to Mazhar Aziz, "It is reasonable to argue that the Pakistani armed forces exhibit characteristics of both the Indonesian model in terms of the former considerable economic interests and the Turkish model, whereby the creation of National Security Council in Pakistan and strengthening the office of the President through constitutional amendments are illustrative of the military control and influence within the state." (34 )
People have started realizing that what army is doing is for the benefit of a few army officers and their influential friends. Writing on the subject matter, in "˜Power, Perks, Prestige', Ayesha Sidiqa Agha stated, "Over the years the interests have narrowed down from the greater benefit of the institution to personal welfare of the generals." (35) The public is beginning to see that all the promises General Musharaf made in his first speech to the nation turned out to be unfulfilled. Recently, he has been boasting on his economic performance. One of the proponents of Musharaf's economic policies, Mr. Shahid Javed Burki, had this to say in his column published in Dawn of July 19, 2006, "with the policies currently in place, the sustainable rate of growth is not seven but four percent a year. At four percent, the pool of poverty will not shrink while income disparities- both interpersonal and interregional- will continue to increase. This is a recipe for social and political instability."
General Musharaf also boasts of eliminating corruption at the higher levels but he is proved incorrect by massive corruption at those very levels proved by Supreme Court in Karachi Steel Mill case, by Parliamentarian Standing Committee in the import of Rail Carriages, and by the chairman SECP in the doctored crash of Karachi Stock Exchange in 2005/2006. The list goes on. In social sector, General Musharaf did nothing but increased the gap between the rich and the poor. He inadvertently conceded to this fact in his recent address to the nation, when he boasted as to how the sales of mobiles, the air-conditioners, the motor bikes and the cars have increased. The public perceives his government as Mafia government full of scams; be that is sugar scam, cement scam, land scam, oil-price scam or earth quake and draught fund scam. Hardly a day goes by when a new scam doesn't make headlines in the national dailies. As a result of this "˜Mafiaism', people can see lawlessness on the streets, poor governance in the offices, and poverty in their homes. There is massive unemployment. Prices of common commodity are sky-high. The edibles are beyond the reach of the poor. Many poor are either killing themselves or murdering their small children because they cannot afford to feed themselves or their families. There is despair and despondency among the have-nots. On the other hand, his cronies are lavishly treated with bullet-proof limousines, palatial bungalows and non-transparent contracts worth millions. While poor are dying of trivial diseases at home, his close friends and relatives are sent abroad for minor illnesses. As a result, in frenzy of disenchantment all those who were looking up to the army as their icon, are now looking down upon them with repugnance. It is all because general Musharaf has not only destroyed democracy in the country but also brought down the good name of the army in the eyes of the public.
With all the moral, political and professional declination, General Musharaf still pretends to be powerful as he thinks the army and the public are behind him. But history tells us that usurpers are basically weak people. According to David C Rapoport, "The usurper is obsessed with reading public moods because resistance even on a minor scale could divide the military leadership on moral ground" (36) This position is explained by Mazhar when he said, "The obsession with anticipating the public mood, arguably, can be understood in the context of the quest for legitimacy by the military, after the intervention." (37). It is that moral ground he is loosing fast.
The leaders of the two main-stream parties have given the people of Pakistan a hope in the shape of Charter of Democracy in which they are trying to undo the undemocratic wrongs intentionally done by non political forces for many decades. They have taken the task because some body has to do it no matter what the consequences. They are trying to go ahead and keep on pressing peacefully until they achieve their objectives and make the military go back to barracks, never to return to haunt the public and politics of Pakistan.
In the end let us look at the excerpts of a senior army officer with a rank of major general who had served on faculty of NDC and show you how the army mind thinks. According to him, "as matter of understanding, any issue which ultimately results in the use of force as a consequence of any development at some stage should fall into national security categorization," (38) He further stated, "If we consider among other, diplomacy, economy, the military and media as elements of concern than weakening of any of these elements should also be categorized as national security concern." (39) In other words he is saying that all the elements associated with routine democratic government could become the military concern if they so decide. It can therefore be inferred that military justification of removing of civilian governments in Pakistan is likely attributable to this broad interpretation of what constitute the national security. The military rulers from General Ayub in 1958 to General Musharaf in 1999 have resorted to this argument.
Let us see what does another senior army officer has to say? According to Lieutenant Gen Attiqur Rehman "Army mind-especially of those in appointments that mattered-had come to accept and expect that army as whole could take on any and every problem of the state. And this without any reasonable knowledge of political science, statecraft and the working of the various and difficult state machinery." (40)
The last two excerpts speak plenty of the mindset of generals in Pak-army.
CONCLUDED
References:
1"¦ Mazhar Aziz.. Parallel State: Understanding military role in Pakistan "¦"˜Memo of conversation. ..page 261
2"¦The Emergence of Pakistan page 242-243
3"¦Keith Callard"¦Pakistan: a political study. Page 141
4"¦Ibid
5"¦"˜Quotes from Quaid'. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting page 34
6"¦Ibid page 70
7"¦Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema "˜Pakistan's Defence Policy' page 74
8"¦Allan McGarth "˜The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy' page 97
9.. Hamid Khan "˜Constitutional and Political History' page 131
10.. Ibid
11..Keesing's Contemporary Archives page 16457
12..Wolfgeng peter Zingel "˜Pakistan in the 80s' page 127
13..Jahan Pakistan:failure in national integration page 23
14..Aftab Ahmad 1958 coup in the light of British papers: Dawn Jan 30, 2004
15..Ibid
16..Ibid
17..\bilal Hashmi "˜United States' page 125
18..Khalid B Saeed Politics in Pakistan : Nature and direction in change page 45
19.. Mazhar Aziz.. Memo of conversation. ..page 261
20..Robert E Goodin &Hense-Dieter Klungemann A new handbook of Political Science
page 145
21..Feldman "˜Revolution in Pakistan' page 40
22..Mazhar Aziz. .Parallel States...page 211
23.. Hamid Khan "˜Constitutional and Political History' page 567
24..Ibid page 260
25..Green Book page 276-277
26..Douglas Bland "˜A Unified theory of Civil-Military relation pp 7-26
27.. Mazhar Aziz. .Parallel States
28..'The World Bank Pakistan Economic Report April 7, 1999
29..Vali Nasr Muslim Democracy page 21-22
30..Bruce Reidel "˜The American Diplomacy' Page 12, 15
31.. Vali Nasr Muslim Democracy page 21-22
32..Mazhar Aziz Parallel State
33 ..Mazhar Aziz Parallel State page 274
34..Ibid
35..Ayesha Siddiqa Agha "˜Power, Perks, Prestige and Privileges; Military activities in
Pakistan page 2
36..David C Rapoport Vol 83, pp 551-572
37.. Mazhar Aziz Parallel State page 58
38"¦Ibid "˜Interview' March 2003, Karachi page 264
39.. Ibid
40..Lt.Gen Atiqur-Rehman "˜Leadership: Senior Commanders' page 15
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